Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010. The statute amended existing statutes like the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it referenced other major financial reform laws like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Dodd-Frank requires businesses to make a wide variety of disclosures about their financial activities, and it offers incentives to company insiders, or “whistleblowers,” to report violations. It penalizes employers that retaliate against whistleblowers. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in favor of a whistleblower in a retaliation claim that is relevant to future California employment cases. Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). The case depended on Dodd-Frank’s ambiguous use of the word “whistleblower.” The ruling conflicts with at least one other appellate court’s interpretation of the statute. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case in November 2017.
Dodd-Frank’s language regarding whistleblower retaliation is ambiguous. It prohibits employers from retaliating against whistleblowers who make reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as required by Dodd-Frank or other statutes, including but not limited to Sarbanes-Oxley. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). This would seem to include reports to other agencies besides the SEC, as well as internal reports to company management. The ambiguity is due to the word “whistleblower,” which is defined in an earlier subsection specifically as anyone “who provide[s] information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC].” Id. at § 78u-6(a)(6). The statute does not make it clear whether the anti-retaliation provision refers to the statute’s narrow definition of a whistleblower or uses a broader plain-language meaning.
The SEC’s regulation implementing the anti-retaliation provision, first promulgated in 2011, appears similarly ambiguous by repeating much of the language of the statute. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12F-2. The agency clarified, however, that it did not interpret “whistleblower” broadly to “include individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities other than the [SEC].” 76 Fed. Reg. 34299, 34304 (Jun. 13, 2011); see also 80 Fed. Reg. 47829 (Aug. 10, 2015). In court disputes over the ambiguity in the statute, how the court will rule depends on whether it follows the Chevron doctrine, which holds that courts should give deference to agency interpretations of statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).